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California’s Broken Parole System:
Flawed Standards and Insufficient
Oversight Threaten the Rights
of Prisoners
By STEVE DISHAROON*

Introduction

O

N DECEMBER 15, 1978, Ronald Hayward entered a bar in Sierra
Madre, California, joined by several members of a motorcycle gang to
which he belonged.1 Once inside, another man allegedly assaulted
and attempted to rape Hayward’s girlfriend.2 A fight ensued, during
which Hayward stabbed the man to death.3 A jury convicted Hayward
of second-degree murder and sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life in prison.4 Once in prison, Hayward retired from his motorcycle gang, completed extensive vocational
training, and obtained a GED.5 He led prison tours and remained free
from major disciplinary action for the twenty years leading up to his
final appeal.6 He avoided even minor disciplinary action for over ten
years.7 Furthermore, Hayward remained free of drugs and alcohol, received favorable psychological evaluations, and established concrete
plans for his life outside of prison.8 Despite these positive efforts, the
Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) repeatedly denied Hayward pa* Class of 2010. B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz. I would like to thank
Professor Suzanne Mounts for alerting me to this important topic and for assisting me
during the writing process. I would also like to thank the University of San Francisco Law
Review for all their hard work in bringing the Comment to publication. Finally, my most
heartfelt thanks goes to my family for providing me with limitless love and support.
1. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. For a discussion of indeterminate sentencing, see infra Part I.A.
5. Hayward, 512 F.3d at 538.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 539.
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role a total of eleven times by November 2003.9 After the most recent
denial, Hayward filed a state habeas corpus petition, which the California Supreme Court ultimately denied.10 He then filed a federal
habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied.11 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, reasoning that “no evidence in the record supports a
determination that Hayward’s release would unreasonably endanger
public safety.”12 Finally, after twenty-seven years in prison, at the age
of sixty-four, Hayward was granted parole.13
This Comment focuses on the parole suitability determinations of
California prisoners, like Hayward, who have received indeterminate
sentences. It posits that the system is flawed on both the administrative
and judicial levels and argues that these problems must be rectified in
order to protect prisoners’ rights. Part I provides an overview of the
system, discusses the establishment of prisoners’ rights in this context
and outlines the foundational case law. Part II discusses Proposition 9,
passed by California voters in November 2008. Part III asserts that the
California Supreme Court has acquiesced to a flawed regulatory
scheme and suggests changes to the regulations. Part IV discusses additional policy concerns, including the current crisis of prison overcrowding in California. Part V suggests potential solutions and
addresses the parole systems of other states.

I.

Background

A. An Overview of Sentencing and the Roles of the Executive
California uses both determinate and indeterminate sentencing.
Under the former, sentences are specified by the legislature, with the
goal of maintaining uniform sentences for similar offenses based on
the seriousness of the crime.14 Crimes that carry determinate
sentences often specify three terms of imprisonment—a high, middle,
and low term.15 The sentencing judge has complete discretion in determining which of the three to apply, based on aggravation and mitigation evidence.16 By contrast, under the indeterminate sentencing
9. See id. at 539–40. The Board actually granted parole the last two times, but both
times Governor Gray Davis reversed. Id. The Governor’s ability to reverse grants of parole
is discussed infra Part I.A.
10. Id. at 540.
11. Id. at 540–41.
12. Id. at 544.
13. Id. at 538.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2009).
15. Id. § 1170(b).
16. Id.
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scheme, judges are explicitly prohibited from applying a fixed sentence—one that contains a maximum number of years to be served.17
Indeterminate sentencing applies in murder cases; first-degree murder carries an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life, and
second-degree murder generally carries an indeterminate sentence of
fifteen years to life.18 Indeterminate sentencing also applies in other
serious felonies where the penalty is described as “life with the possibility of parole.”19 The California Supreme Court has stated that the
purpose of indeterminate sentencing is “to mitigate the punishment
which would otherwise be imposed upon the offender. These laws
place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender. They seek to
make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the crime.”20
When a prisoner is given an indeterminate sentence, the duty of
deciding when, and if, the inmate is released rests with the Board.21
The Board is comprised of seventeen commissioners, each appointed
by the governor, subject to senate approval, for a term of three
years.22 Twelve commissioners oversee adult parole determinations.23
At the time of publication, the majority of these commissioners had
backgrounds in law enforcement and/or military service.24 This is not
a new phenomenon, and critics argue that the Board is inevitably
prejudiced against granting parole.25
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168(b) (West 2004).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2009). The minimum term for second degree
murder can be increased if certain aggravating circumstances are present. E.g., id. § 190(b)
(increasing the sentence for second degree murder to twenty-five years to life if the victim
was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the defendant
knew, or should have known, this).
19. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 209(a), (b)(1) (West 2009) (applying this indeterminate
sentence to certain forms of kidnapping).
20. Ex parte Lee, 171 P. 958, 959 (Cal. 1918).
21. See EDWARD A. RUCKER & MARK E. OVERLAND, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRACTICE MOTIONS, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND SENTENCING 181–82 (3d ed. 2004).
22. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12838.4 (West 2009).
23. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, http://www.cdcr.ca.
gov/Divisions_Boards/BOPH/index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
24. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, http://www.cdcr.ca.
gov/Divisions_Boards/BOPH/commissioners.html (follow links to individual Board members) (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
25. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, California Parole Board Is on Receiving End of a Grilling, for
a Change, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/06/
local/me-parole6 (“Where are the social scientists, the psychologists? Where are the people who bring a different dimension to life, a different view on rehabilitation?”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Dr. B. Cayenne Bird, Real Prison Reform Must Include Sentencing
and Parole Changes, CAL. CHRONICLE, Sept. 25, 2006, http://www.californiachronicle.com/
articles/view/13934 (“The current [Board] is comprised of people who will most assuredly
almost never grant a parole, even to those who have earned it. Every entity of the govern-
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California prisoners who are eligible for parole meet with the
Board one year prior to their minimum eligible parole release date.26
At this meeting, the Board determines the inmate’s suitability for parole.27 If the inmate is found suitable, the Board “shall normally set a
parole release date” such that similar offenses receive uniform terms
and the inmate’s “threat to the public” is taken into consideration.28
The Board is required to release those who are eligible for parole unless they pose a current threat to the public.29 In determining suitability, the Board is bound by its authorizing statute. One of its duties is to
“establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates.”30 Pursuant to
this provision, the Board has established a number of factors to consider in determining parole suitability.31 The regulations adopted by
the Board encompass a total of six unsuitability factors and nine suitability factors.32 After the Board makes its decision, the governor is permitted to affirm, modify, or reverse “on the basis of the same factors
which the parole authority is required to consider.”33
The Board is notorious for denying parole to “99% of eligible
inmates.”34 Thus, out of the estimated 5000 inmates eligible for parole,35 4950 remain in prison. Each inmate costs the State approximately $35,587 per year to incarcerate.36 By multiplying this by the
number of inmates who remain in prison (4950), the total annual cost
of keeping these inmates in prison is approximately $176,155,650.
The cost of supervising an inmate on parole is substantially lower—
only $4,338 per inmate per year,37 or a total of $21,473,100 for all
4950. Therefore, by granting parole to every single eligible inmate,
ment is purchased and/or dominated by law enforcement labor unions so that virtually no
‘lifer’ gets out, even those who have earned it or are well past being a danger to society.”).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a) (West 2008). The minimum time, minus good time
credits, is usually twenty-five years for prisoners convicted of first-degree murder, fifteen
years for those convicted of second-degree murder, and seven years for those convicted of
other crimes that are punishable by a life sentence. See RUCKER & OVERLAND, supra note 21,
at 182.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a) (West 2008).
28. Id.
29. See id. § 3041(b).
30. Id. § 3041(a).
31. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281 (2008).
32. Id. § 2402(c), (d).
33. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(b).
34. Bird, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, FOURTH QUARTER
2008 FACTS AND FIGURES (2008), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/
Adult_Operations/docs/Fourth_Quarter_2008_Facts_and_Figures.pdf.
37. Id.

R

R
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the State could theoretically save $154,682,550 per year.38 These
figures demonstrate the enormity of the taxpayer cost at stake, and
emphasizethe need to make the right decisions regarding parole suitability determinations.
B. The Rights Retained by Prisoners
Prisoners maintain three distinct rights in the context of parole:
(1) a statutory right; (2) a procedural due process right; and (3) a
substantive due process right. In regard to the first right, the Legislature intended for parole to be granted “unless . . . public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.”39 Therefore, parole
denials that ignore public safety concerns violate the statute and the
express intent of the Legislature.40
As to the second right, the California Supreme Court has recognized that “the requirement of procedural due process embodied in
the California Constitution places some limitations upon the broad
discretionary authority of the Board.”41 Additionally, the court has
stated that there is “a limited cognizance of rights of parole applicants
to be free from an arbitrary parole decision, to secure information
necessary to prepare for interviews with the [Board], and to something more than mere pro forma consideration.”42 Thus, a prisoner’s
procedural due process right is violated when, for example, the Board
fails to issue a statement that articulates its reasons for denying
parole.43
The substantive due process right is the focus of this Comment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when a state statute
mandates the granting of parole pursuant, of course, to certain public
safety requirements, it creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest.44 The key lies in the “mandatory language” of the parole stat38. This Comment recognizes that not every eligible inmate will necessarily be found
suitable for parole.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b) (West 2008).
40. A more in-depth analysis of the statutory right is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
41. In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 203 (Cal. 2002) (citations omitted).
42. In re Sturm, 521 P.2d 97, 104 (Cal. 1974).
43. Id. at 107. A more in-depth analysis of the procedural due process right is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
44. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (“[T]he expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.”).
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ute.45 The California statute includes such mandatory language. It
reads, in relevant part, the Board “shall set a release date unless . . . .”46
Therefore, parole-eligible prisoners in California enjoy a presumption
of conditional release, assuming they satisfy the requirements of the
statute and the regulations.
C. The Establishment of a Judicial Standard of Review
After a denial of parole by the Board or the governor,47 prisoners
may seek judicial review of the executive’s administrative decision.48
They can also challenge their continued incarceration through a writ
of habeas corpus.49 The judiciary is required to uphold the decision of
the executive if it satisfies the highly deferential “some evidence” standard; that is, if any evidence supports the conclusion that the inmate
continues to pose a threat to public safety.50 The standard has evolved
over a number of landmark decisions by the California Supreme
Court.
1. In re Rosenkrantz
The foundational case of In re Rosenkrantz (“Rosenkrantz”) explained the proper standard by which courts should review parole decisions.51 In 1986, Robert Rosenkrantz was convicted of second-degree
murder.52 He killed a boy named Redman in retaliation for a barrage
of homophobic harassment and abuse.53 The breaking point occurred
when Redman revealed to Rosenkrantz’s father that his son was gay.54
45. Allen, 482 U.S. at 377–78 (explaining that mandatory language creates the “presumption that parole release will be granted when the designated findings are made”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
47. The “Board” and the “governor” will be referred to collectively as “the executive”
when specifying one or the other is unnecessary. Both exist within the executive branch,
follow the same statutes and regulations, and are susceptible to the “some evidence” standard of review.
48. See In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 205 (Cal. 2002) (holding that the judiciary has
authority to review the Board’s decision to deny parole); id. at 209 (explaining that this
ability to review such decisions also extends to decisions made by the governor).
49. The writ can be filed in California state court. In re Streeter, 423 P.2d 976, 977
(Cal. 1967) (“Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to test the propriety of proceedings before
the [Board].”). If certain procedural requirements are satisfied, inmates can also file for
habeas relief in federal court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973).
50. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 553 (Cal. 2008).
51. In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 207.
52. Id. at 182–83.
53. See id. at 184–86.
54. Id. at 185.
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Rosenkrantz purchased a gun, and then contacted Redman and urged
him to recant what he had told his father. Redman refused.55 The
next day, Rosenkrantz waited for Redman outside of his house, confronted him, and demanded that he recant.56 After Redman again refused, Rosenkrantz shot and killed him.57
In 1999, after several denials of parole, the superior court
granted Rosenkrantz’s writ of habeas corpus and ordered the Board
to grant parole.58 The Board held a new suitability hearing and reluctantly granted parole.59 The governor reversed, citing the circumstances of the commitment offense and Rosenkrantz’s failure to
demonstrate remorse.60 For a second time, the superior court granted
habeas relief to Rosenkrantz, again finding the executive had deprived him of due process of law by failing to support its denial of
parole with any evidence.61 The appellate court affirmed.62 The California Supreme Court explained that the standard of review is extremely deferential, permitting reversal only when the decision is
unsupported by any evidence in the record.63 Applying this standard,
the court found two pieces of evidence that supported the governor’s
decision: (1) the offense was carried out in a “dispassionate and calculated manner,”64 and (2) Rosenkrantz “did not show signs of remorse
during” the month following the offense, while he was a fugitive.65
2. In re Dannenberg
In In re Dannenberg (“Dannenberg”),66 the court attempted to clarify the standard of review. In 1986, a jury convicted John Dannenberg
of the second-degree murder of his wife.67 The two had experienced
years of domestic problems.68 In 1985, a domestic dispute between the
couple resulted in the drowning death of Dannenberg’s wife.69 The
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 210.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 219–20.
104 P.3d 783 (Cal. 2005).
See id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
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evidence suggested that Dannenberg had struck his wife with a
wrench and either pushed her into a filled bath or did not prevent
her from drowning after she fell into it.70
After the Board denied parole in 1999, Dannenberg filed a petition for habeas corpus.71 The superior court granted the writ, and the
appellate court affirmed in part, reasoning that the Board should have
compared Dannenberg’s crime to other similar offenses and determined parole suitability based on that analysis.72 The case reached the
California Supreme Court, which first clarified the standard that was
established in Rosenkrantz:
So long as the Board’s finding of unsuitability flows from pertinent
criteria, and is supported by “some evidence” in the record before
the Board, the overriding statutory concern for public safety in the
individual case trumps any expectancy the indeterminate life inmate may have in a term of comparative equality with those served
by other similar offenders.73

The court applied this standard and upheld the Board’s determination of unsuitability,74 reasoning that the “exceptional callousness and
cruelty” of the commitment offense provided “some evidence” in support of the Board’s decision.75
3. In re Lawrence
In August 2008, the California Supreme Court again addressed
the proper standard for reviewing parole denials. It considered the
habeas petitions of two defendants—Sandra Lawrence and Richard
Shaputis—and issued two opinions, released together as companion
cases. The bulk of the court’s legal analysis takes place in In re Lawrence (“Lawrence”).76 A jury convicted Lawrence of first-degree murder
in 1982, and sentenced her to life in prison with the possibility of parole.77 She had been involved in an affair with a dentist named Williams.78 When Williams terminated the affair, Lawrence took her
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
penalty
78.

See id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 789–90.
Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805.
190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008).
At the time, “life imprisonment,” as opposed to “25 years to life,” was a possible
for this crime. Id. at 538.
Id. at 539–40.
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anger out on Williams’s wife, Rubye. Lawrence went to Rubye’s office,
where she repeatedly shot her and stabbed her with a potato peeler.79
From December 1993 to January 2006, the Board found Lawrence suitable for parole four times; yet, each time, the governor reversed.80 In the most recent reversal, Governor Schwarzenegger
asserted that the commitment offense was sufficient justification for
the reversal.81 The Governor also cited evidence that, early in her incarceration, Lawrence received unfavorable mental health evaluations
and had denied killing Rubye.82 Lawrence filed a writ of habeas
corpus, which eventually reached the California Supreme Court.83
Again, the court first clarified the “some evidence” standard, by
holding that the proper inquiry is whether there is “some evidence”
the inmate poses a current threat to society, not merely “some evidence” of an unsuitability factor.84 It reasoned this was not only mandated by statute, but also required by the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions.85 The court then analyzed the use of
the commitment offense as the basis for depriving parole to Lawrence. Noting the split in appellate court rulings that had emerged in
the wake of Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg, the court clarified that the
circumstances of the commitment offense are relevant only if they are
probative of the prisoner’s current dangerousness.86 Applying this revised rule, the court found that Lawrence’s “due process and statutory
rights were violated by the Governor’s reliance upon the immutable
and unchangeable circumstances of her commitment offense.”87
4. In re Shaputis
In the companion case, In re Shaputis (“Shaputis”),88 the court applied the legal standard that it clarified in Lawrence. In 1987, a jury
convicted Shaputis of the second-degree murder of his wife and sentenced him to seventeen years to life in prison.89 The record indicated
that on the night of the murder, Shaputis had been drinking heavily
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 540.
Id. at 542–44.
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id. at 545–46.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 564.
190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008).
Id. at 574.
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and, at some point, began to fight with his wife.90 During the fight,
Shaputis shot and killed his wife.91
After multiple parole denials, Shaputis filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the superior court, which affirmed the latest parole denial.92
The appellate court reversed, finding there was no evidence of
Shaputis’ unsuitability for parole.93 In its new suitability hearing, the
Board begrudgingly approved Shaputis for parole.94 The governor reversed, and Shaputis filed a second writ of habeas corpus.95 Again, the
superior court denied the writ, and the appellate court reversed, reasoning that Shaputis no longer posed a risk to the public and therefore should be granted parole.96 The California Supreme Court
reversed, reinstating the governor’s denial of parole.97 The Court recognized that there was evidence Shaputis may no longer pose a risk to
society, and that he had been sober for many years, was advanced in
age, and had chronic health problems.98 Yet, the Court concluded
that “the gravity of the commitment offense and petitioner’s current
attitude toward the crime . . . provide[d] evidence of the risk currently
posed by petitioner.”99 The Court attempted to reconcile this holding
with its decision in Lawrence by noting that, in Lawrence, the murder
“was an isolated incident, committed while [Lawrence] was subject to
emotional stress that was unusual or unlikely to recur.”100

II.

The Effects of Proposition 9

On November 4, 2008, California voters approved Proposition 9
(“Prop 9”),101 which, among other things, altered the process by
which parole is granted or denied.102 The passage of this initiative has
aggravated the preexisting problems with the regulations and stan90. Id. at 576.
91. Id. at 578.
92. Id. at 577–78.
93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. at 579.
95. Id. at 580.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 585.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 575.
100. Id. at 584.
101. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF CAL., VOTES FOR AND AGAINST NOVEMBER 4,
2008, STATE BALLOT MEASURES (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_general/7_votes_for_against.pdf.
102. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF CAL., TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, 128–32
(2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/
text-of-proposed-laws.pdf [hereinafter TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS].

\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN107.txt

Summer 2009]

unknown

Seq: 11

2-OCT-09

PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA

14:09

187

dard of review. Prop 9 included numerous changes to the Penal Code
as well as to the California Constitution. The most significance
changes in the context of parole are to the constitution and to section
3041.5 of the California Penal Code.
A. Changes to the California Constitution
The legislation enacted by Prop 9 is titled the “Victim’s Bill of
Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law.”103 The proposition amended the
constitution in many ways, three of which pose particular concerns.
First, Prop 9’s definition of “victim”104 sheds light on the fact that
Prop 9 was less of a “victims’ rights” effort, and more of an attempt to
diminish the rights of prisoners. It highlights the political influence
and discriminatory practices at work. Second, Prop 9 alters the way in
which the victim’s family members are included in the parole determination process. These changes do not provide actual rights to victims
and have the potential for causing arbitrary and discriminatory denials of parole. Finally, there is a broad policy statement at the end of
the proposition that demeans prisoners and their rights. This third
change highlights the political posturing at work in this context.
1. Definition of “Victim”
Prop 9 amended the constitution to define the term “victim” as
follows:
[A] “victim” is a person who suffers direct . . . harm . . . [and] also
includes the person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representative of a crime victim who is
deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically incapacitated.
The term “victim” does not include a person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court finds would not act
in the best interests of a minor victim.105

While there is certainly logic—and accuracy—in extending the
term to the family members of the direct victim, it is fundamentally
inconsistent to then curtail the definition (as is done in the final sentence). One’s rights as a victim should not hinge on one’s condition
as prisoner. While the People, acting as legislators, certainly have the
right to enact broad definitions of terms like “victim,” they cannot
have it both ways. It must be either narrow, encompassing only the
direct victim, or broad, covering all family members and others, regardless of their statuses as prisoners. It is sensible to exclude the in103. Id. at 128.
104. Id. In this context, “victim” really means the family of the victim.
105. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(e).
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mate, who actually harmed the victim, as well as those who would not
act in the interests of a minor victim. But the definition goes far beyond this and includes anyone who is currently in prison. By illogically
and discriminatorily defining victim, a cloud of corruption and illegitimacy is cast on this entire legislation. This definition indicates that the
drafters were not truly concerned with victims’ rights, but rather
merely wanted to diminish the rights of the prisoner under the guise
of compassion for those harmed by the crime.
2. Inclusion of “Victims” in Parole Determinations
Prop 9 added the following section to the California Constitution:
[A] victim shall be entitled to the following rights: . . . To be informed of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process, to provide information to the parole authority to be
considered before the parole of the offender, and to be notified,
upon request, of the parole or other release of the offender.106

The provision that the Board consider information provided by
the victim poses both practical and constitutional problems. First,
from a practical standpoint, how is the Board to consider such information? Should it assume the absolute validity of any facts provided by
the victim? How is the Board to incorporate unquantifiable information—such as fear of the inmate or disapproval of his or her release
on parole—into its analysis? These questions are raised, not to mock
the potentially noble efforts of victims’ rights activists, but rather to
highlight that Prop 9 may in fact offer empty promises. Prop 9 will
only complicate the decision-making process, charge it with emotion,
and increase the possibility that the Board makes a determination
based on how it feels rather than on real evidence.
This provision also poses a threat to prisoners’ due process rights
in that it may lead to arbitrary and discriminatory denials of parole.
For example, if two inmates, convicted of the same crime, were both
eligible and equally suitable for parole, the proper outcome would be
for both to be paroled. However, after Prop 9, if one set of victims is
strongly opposed to parole, then they may be able to convince the
Board to deny release. Thus, two equally suitable parole candidates
would be arbitrarily given different treatment.
Although these concerns are worst-case scenarios, they highlight
the danger in the legislation of emotion. It may seem fair to include
victims in the parole-determination process, but they, presumably, are
not experts in criminology. More importantly, a victim’s close connec106. Id. § 28(b)(15).
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tion to the inmate no doubt prejudices his or her opinion of that inmate’s suitability for parole. As terrible as their crimes may have been,
the justice system should not allow for the denial of due process based
on animus or vengeance. Instead, justice demands a fair procedure
that has the sole aim of accurately determining an inmate’s threat to
society.
3. Unnecessary Statements That Degrade Prisoners’ Rights
Prop 9 inserted the following language into the constitution:
“The current process for parole hearings is excessive, especially in
cases in which the defendant has been convicted of murder. The parole hearing process must be reformed for the benefit of crime victims.”107 As a preliminary matter, this provision is completely devoid
of any substantive law. It is a political statement. The California Constitution, and the process of amending it, should not be used as a
platform for asserting a political agenda. It is no secret that prisoners
are not a well-liked group of individuals. But characterizing efforts to
ensure fairness and equity in the parole system as excessive is unwarranted. In addition, taking such a position is impractical given extreme prison overcrowding108 and the claim that 99% of eligible
prisoners are denied parole.109 It is irresponsible to refer to the parole
process as excessive when, in fact, California’s prisons are in desperate
need of population reduction, and there are thousands of inmates
who may actually be suitable for parole.
B. Changes to Section 3041.5 of the California Penal Code
Prop 9 resulted in drastic revisions, as well as numerous additions, to section 3041.5 of the California Penal Code. Perhaps the
most astonishing change is the increase in the waiting period for a
reconsideration hearing after parole has been denied.110 While this
does not alter the basis upon which parole is ultimately granted or
denied, it aggravates the problem by prolonging the incarceration of
an inmate who is worthy of parole, but has been wrongfully denied it
based on a flawed initial suitability determination. In other words,
while the changes to section 3041.5 do not directly affect the determi107. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (f)(6).
108. See Bird, supra note 25.
109. See id.
110. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, supra note 102, at 130–31 (extending the maximum
waiting time from five to at least fifteen years, and the minimum from one to at the earliest
three years).

R
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nation of a prisoner’s suitability for parole, they aggravate any errors
that do take place. Until California repairs its broken system of parole
suitability determinations, it is unwise to so drastically extend the waiting period for the reconsideration of prisoners’ claims.
There are two other important changes to section 3041.5. The
first is subsection (6) of paragraph (a), which reads as follows: “The
board shall set a date to reconsider whether an inmate should be released on parole that ensures a meaningful consideration of whether
the inmate is suitable for release on parole.”111 The problem is that
neither this sentence, nor any other part of the section, explains what
is meant by “meaningful consideration.” Presumably, this refers to section 3041, and the requirement that parole be granted unless the inmate is determined to pose a current threat to society.112 On the
other hand, the context here is different; it concerns a reconsideration hearing rather than the original granting of parole. Therefore,
this addition to section 3041.5 injects more uncertainty and potential
for arbitrariness into the system. The new language provides the
Board with statutory justification for unnecessarily prolonging the review of an inmate’s suitability for parole. This subsection must be
amended to clarify its intent and provide better standards for the
Board to follow.
The second relevant addition also concerns the timing of an inmate’s rehearing. Subsection (b)(4) allows the Board, in its discretion, to advance the rehearing to an earlier date, but only after it
considers “the views and interests of the victim.”113 As with the
changes to the constitution, this injects the potential for arbitrariness
and discrimination into the process.114 It is improper, and potentially
unconstitutional, to allow victims to dictate the conditions of an inmate’s rights—in this case, the right to a hearing.115
C. A Final Word on “Victims’ Rights”
The respect for, and maintenance of, victims’ rights is fundamental to our legal system. However, prisoners, too, retain certain funda111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(a)(6) (West 2008).
112. See id. § 3041(b).
113. Id. § 3041.5(b)(4).
114. See supra Part II.A.2.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a) (West 2008); See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915
(9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the statutory right to a parole-suitability hearing). Additionally,
since there is a substantive due process right to parole in California, it necessarily follows
that in order to protect that right, there must also be a procedural due process right—i.e., a
right to a hearing.
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mental rights.116 These two interests must be balanced. And at some
point, the rights of victims must be recognized as sufficiently vindicated by our system. In certain contexts, like parole suitability hearings, the rights of victims must give way to the liberty interests of
inmates to be free from prejudiced adjudications. Three reasons support this conclusion.
First, victims are represented throughout the investigation and
trial of a criminal case. Through a conviction, justice is restored to the
victim and to society at large. After this point, however, the defendant—now, prisoner—is the responsibility of the State, which must
make all decisions relating to the confinement, control, and rehabilitation of the inmate. Parole-suitability determinations fall within the
scope of these duties. The rights of the victim, having been addressed,
should not be revived merely because an inmate becomes eligible for
parole.
Second, criminal prosecutions are carried out in the name of the
State. The civil law provides ample tools for victims who seek redress
from criminal defendants, such as restraining orders, wrongful death
suits, and other tort claims. Especially in the parole context, where
potential dangerousness should be the only factor, a consideration of
the retributive concerns of victims is improper
Finally, and perhaps most important, victims should not be allowed to influence parole determinations given the due process rights
at stake. Constitutional rights, such as the right to parole, cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. Allowing victims to influence the parole process
will undoubtedly lead to such results. For example, if one inmate’s
direct victim did not have any family members, then there would be
no victims left to oppose the granting of parole. Another similarly situated inmate may not be so “lucky.” Such disparate treatment should
not be tolerated when constitutional rights are at stake.

III.

Problems with the Board’s Regulations

A. The Unsuitability Factors
In Lawrence, the court stated that denying parole to an eligible
inmate without a showing of some evidence of current dangerousness
deprives the inmate of due process.117 But the court’s solution does
116. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (famously stating that “[p]rison
walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution” and citing numerous examples of rights retained by prisoners).
117. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 552 (Cal. 2008).
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not solve the problem that it should have recognized; many of the
factors currently considered by the Board can always show some evidence of current dangerousness. They are overbroad, misused, and
many “contain such vague criteria that the [Board] can in practice
ignore proportionality in sentencing.”118 Thus, they permit the Board
to provide a mere pro forma review, without offering adequate reasoning for the decision. This result is illustrated by the following factor-byfactor analysis of these regulations.
1. The “Commitment Offense”
The “Commitment Offense” is the most complex factor; it includes five sub-factors and it has the overarching requirement that the
offense was committed “in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner.”119 The United States Supreme Court has found this exact
language to be unconstitutionally vague in capital cases.120 In those
cases, the Court analyzed the aggravating circumstances used to impose the death penalty, but the rationale is the same here; certain
language is simply so vague that it fails to provide any standard for
distinguishing between different murders. In the Court’s own words,
“[t]o say that something is ‘especially heinous’ merely suggests that
the individual jurors should determine that the murder is more than
just ‘heinous,’ whatever that means.”121 Like a jury attempting to
make a sentencing determination, the executive is similarly left completely unguided by such vague language.
Beyond being overly vague, this factor is also problematic in that
it addresses conduct that is unchangeable. As one commentator argues, “one wonders why an inmate whose offense alone precluded parole would ever become suitable for parole. The facts of the
commitment offense will not change.”122 Of course, Lawrence explicitly requires that this factor actually be probative of current danger118. Alexander K. Mircheff, Comment, In re Dannenberg: California Forgoes Meaningful
Judicial Review of Parole Denials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 907, 914 (2006).
119. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1) (2008).
120. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988); see also Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980) (forbidding the use of similar language—“outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman”—reasoning that “[a] person of ordinary sensibility
could fairly characterize almost every murder as ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman’”).
121. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364.
122. See Mircheff, supra note 118, at 935–36; see also id. at 940 (“Of all the factors that
could potentially impact public safety, a commitment offense fifteen years prior seems the
least relevant.”).
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ousness.123 But the court should not have had to mandate this, as it is
already statutorily required. Furthermore, this simple judicial decree
does not solve the problem. The standard of review is so deferential
that the executive merely has to provide some articulation of why the
offense is probative of dangerousness and, the court must defer to
that determination under its own standard. This is exactly what happened in In re Hyde (“Hyde”),124 where a California appellate court
reinstated a denial of parole based solely on the commitment
offense.125
In 1973, Hyde was convicted of first-degree murder, four counts
of robbery, and two assault charges.126 In 2005, after Hyde was denied
parole for the twentieth time,127 the superior court granted his writ of
habeas corpus and reversed the Board’s most recent denial.128 Before
reversing the superior court’s decision, the appellate court cited a
laundry list of positive factors, all tending to show suitability. The
court noted that Hyde had been free of any disciplinary infractions for
ten years, parole-eligible for nineteen years, only eighteen at the time
of the offense, and that thirty-three years had passed since the
crime.129 Furthermore, the court found that he “was a positive and
perhaps notable participant in his institution’s training programs, activities and organizations, and had positive [reviews] from the training
supervisors and prison staff.”130 Nevertheless, the court held that some
evidence supported the Board’s denial of parole because “these
crimes went beyond the minimum necessary to commit the offenses,
and the fashion in which the offenses were committed was cruel and
callous, calculated, and demonstrated an exceptional disregard for
human suffering.”131 One year later, the California Supreme Court in
Lawrence cited Hyde with approval.132 The court reasoned the Hyde
court had “concluded that the circumstances of petitioner’s numerous commitment offenses were both particularly egregious and provided evidence of his continuing threat to public safety.”133 With this
finding, the court sanctioned the use of the commitment offense as
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 555 (Cal. 2008).
65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162 (Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 163.
See id. at 165.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 174–75.
Id.
Id. at 175.
In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 556 n.15, 565 (Cal. 2008).
Id. at 556 n.15.
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the sole factor for denying parole even when the underlying offense
occurs in the distant past—thirty-three years in this case.
2. “Previous Record of Violence”
The second factor, “Previous Record of Violence,”134 presents the
same problem as the “Commitment Offense” in that it refers to unchangeable conduct. The California Court of Appeals addressed both
of these factors, and raised concerns about each:
The commitment offense is one of only two factors indicative of
unsuitability a prisoner cannot change (the other being his “Previous Record of Violence”). Reliance on such an immutable factor
“without regard to or consideration of subsequent circumstances”
may be unfair, and “runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process
violation.”135

However, this factor goes even further, specifying that “serious
assaultive behavior at an early age” should be given special attention.136 The regulations do not explain why this is relevant to current
dangerousness, or how the factor is to be used. In addition, this factor
poses an ethical concern, alluded to by the appellate court; how are
individuals ever to be rehabilitated if past bad conduct forever haunts
them? While Lawrence held that this factor may only be used if it is
truly probative of current dangerousness, this is an extremely low, or
even non-existent, hurdle, as evidenced by Hyde.
3. “Unstable Social History”
The third unsuitability factor allows the Board to look at whether
“[t]he prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships
with others.”137 This is both vague and overbroad; it provides no indication of how far back the Board should look into the inmate’s “history,” what is meant by “unstable or tumultuous,” or how any of this is
probative of current dangerousness. These concerns are not merely
theoretical. In In re Bettencourt (“Bettencourt”),138 a California appellate
court held that the fact that the inmate had “drank alcohol and used
drugs” when he was younger provided “a modicum of evidence in sup134. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(2) (2008).
135. In re Scott, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 919–20 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal citations and
footnote omitted). It should be noted that the claim that these are the “only two factors”
that the prisoner cannot change is not in fact true; virtually all of the unsuitability factors
carry a level of immutability. See infra Parts III.A.3–6.
136. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(2) (2008).
137. Id. § 2402(c)(3).
138. 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (Ct. App. 2007).
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port of the Board’s finding that Bettencourt has an unstable social
history.”139 The court in Lawrence reviewed Bettencourt, and acknowledged some concern over the appellate court’s use of the “Commitment Offense.”140 However, it specifically cited the use of the
“Unstable Social History” factor as evidence that the case was properly
decided and should not be overturned.141
An even more deferential approach was taken in In re Burns
(“Burns”),142 where an appellate court concluded, without any analysis, that “[t]he Board also found that Burns has a history of unstable
or tumultuous relationships with others” and that “[t]he record contains ‘some evidence’ supporting this finding.”143 Again, the court in
Lawrence explicitly approved of this case. It reasoned that there was no
error since it was not the only evidence relied on by the Board.144 This
is surprising because the Burns court stated there was evidence to support the finding and did not specify whether this evidence was actually
probative of current dangerousness. Thus, in the very case in which it
announced this requirement, the court failed to enforce it.
In both of these decisions, the court seemed comforted by the
fact that the appellate courts had cited numerous factors of unsuitability.145 However, the definition of the “some evidence” standard demonstrates that this is irrelevant, because only a modicum of evidence is
required.146 It is troubling how easily these courts have used the “Unstable Social History” factor to uphold denials of parole. This factor
again raises the question of how an inmate is ever to become rehabilitated. More importantly, the factor poses a serious threat to the inmate’s liberty interest in being granted parole unless he or she is
found to pose a current threat to society.
4. “Sadistic Sexual Offenses”
The fourth unsuitability factor allows the Board to consider
whether “[t]he prisoner has previously sexually assaulted another in a
manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.”147
No California court has addressed the use of this factor, nor has any
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 513.
See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 565 (Cal. 2008).
Id.
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 7 (internal citation omitted).
In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 565.
See id.
In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 184 (Cal. 2002).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(4) (2008).
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commentator analyzed it. It raises the question of why sexual assaults
are singled out. The regulations already require the Board to address
past violent crimes and social problems. Therefore, this factor is superfluous. In all likelihood, political motives were behind its creation.
Sex crimes invoke a particular disdain from the public, and politicians
often make special exceptions in the law to confront them.148 But the
law must be reasoned and logical, rather than vengeful and emotional. This is particularly important in this context given the prisoners’ rights at stake. The Board, which is embroiled in the politics of
the executive branch, cannot be allowed to be unduly influenced by
the repugnance of the inmate’s past crimes. This threat is already present with the first three factors, but it reaches a new level of inappropriateness here. This factor should therefore be eliminated, so as to
prevent this threat from becoming a reality.
5. “Psychological Factors”
The fifth unsuitability factor calls for the Board to analyze
whether “[t]he prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental
problems related to the offense.”149 This factor was at issue in the Bettencourt case, where it proved problematic.150 The court noted two
pieces of evidence that supported the Board’s finding of this factor.
First, the court addressed the evaluation of Dr. Donoviel, assigned to
Bettencourt, who found that the risk of “future violent behavior was
‘no greater than for others in society’ only if Bettencourt received positive recognition and there were ‘no significant threats to his narcissistic ego.’”151 Dr. Donoviel also recommended that Bettencourt
participate in one-on-one psychotherapy.152 The court found these
two statements provided some evidence of current dangerousness,
and reasoned that “the Board could infer from Dr. Donoviel’s report
that Bettencourt’s release on parole would pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to society unless he received psychotherapy treatment to
enable him to avoid responding violently when his narcissistic ego was
threatened.”153
148. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2003) (allowing evidence of past sexual
offenses to be admitted in a current sex crime preceding). This is an exception to the
general rule that character evidence is inadmissible to prove conduct. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1101 (West 1996).
149. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(5) (2008).
150. In re Bettencourt, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 514–15 (Ct. App. 2007).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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In analyzing the court’s reasoning, it is appropriate to reiterate
the fact that the members of the Board, while experts in penology,
perhaps lack the requisite psychological training to make the determinations called for by this factor.154 While, as in this case, psychologists
and doctors may be assigned to the prisoners, the ultimate decision
rests with the Board. It would aid the process if such professionals
were actually members of the Board. Furthermore, as evidenced by
this case, the Board is not required to analyze or interpret the findings
of the doctors in order to be given judicial deference: the court
merely states that “the Board could infer . . . .”155 This demonstrates
that the courts will affirm a parole denial even in the absence of proof
that the Board actually considered the inmate’s suitability. Thus, a parole denial can be based solely on an unfavorable psychological
report.
The second piece of evidence was the fact that Bettencourt interjected twice at his parole suitability hearing. While Bettencourt argued
that he had merely tried to take responsibility for the crime, and had
not been violent or inappropriate in his interruptions, the Board concluded that these “outbursts” raised concerns “as to how Bettencourt
would behave if free in the community.”156 The Board based its concerns on testing performed by Dr. Donoviel, and his finding that “Bettencourt’s test results were consistent with ‘individuals [who] are
noted to have problems with emotional control. They tend to overuse
denial to control aggressive impulses. While they are generally over
controlled they occasionally may have angry/violent outbursts that
cause concern or embarrassment.’”157
The court dismissed Bettencourt’s argument quickly, reasoning
that Bettencourt’s claim amounted to an implicit contention that the
Board had awarded undue weight to this evidence and did not have
authority, under the some evidence standard, to reweigh the evidence.158 The opinion demonstrates that under the current standard
courts do not even have the power to ask whether the Board acted
unreasonably in its weighing of evidence because the some evidence
standard dictates that any evidence is sufficient. Even under the current standard, however, the court’s analysis is flawed. It seems to have
ignored the critical part of Dr. Donoviel’s statement. Dr. Donoviel
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Bird, supra note 25.
In re Bettencourt, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 514 (emphasis added).
Id. at 515.
Id. at 514.
Id.

R
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noted that any outbursts that Bettencourt may experience would
cause “concern or embarrassment,” but he did not say that such outbursts were dangerous, which should have been the sole focus of the
Board’s inquiry.
6. “Institutional Behavior”
The sixth unsuitability factor involves an analysis of the inmate’s
“serious misconduct” in prison.159 This factor is an important one and
should be retained. On its face, this factor is certainly probative of
current dangerousness. However, caution is required regarding the
use of misconduct that has occurred in the distant past. Forever holding such misconduct against the inmate not only diminishes the drive
for good behavior, but also deprives the inmate of the due process
right to a consideration of current dangerousness.
B. The Suitability Factors
The nine suitability factors raise different concerns from those of
the unsuitability factors. While unsuitability factors primarily present
“facial” problems, the suitability factors raise “as applied” concerns.
The Board often uses the lack of a suitability factor to show unsuitability. This practice should be discontinued because the burden is on the
Board to show unsuitability, not on the inmate to show suitability.160
In particular, California courts often use an inmate’s inability to
show signs of remorse161 as evidence of his or her unsuitability for
parole. For example, in Rosenkrantz, the court agreed with the following statement made by the governor: “[Rosenkrantz] demonstrated a
lack of remorse by affirming his violent act after the crime was committed, attempting to mitigate his role in the crime, portraying himself as a victim, lying about numerous aspects of the murder, and not
taking full responsibility for the crime.”162 Similarly, in In re
Shaputis,163 the court made the following statement:
[W]e conclude that some evidence in the record supports the Governor’s conclusion that petitioner remains a threat to public safety
in that he has failed to take responsibility for the murder of his
wife, and despite years of rehabilitative programming and participation in substance abuse programs, has failed to gain insight into
his previous violent behavior, including the brutal domestic vio159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(6) (2008).
See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(3) (2008).
In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 189 (Cal. 2002).
190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008).
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lence inflicted upon his wife and children for many years preceding the commitment offense.164

Later in the opinion, the court conceded that the record actually did
show that Shaputis had demonstrated some remorse for his crimes,
but concluded that this showing was simply inadequate.165
Similar to remorse, the Board has also used the failure of an inmate to show adequate understanding and “[p]lans for [the]
[f]uture”166 as evidence of current dangerousness.167 However, an inmate’s dangerousness to society cannot be demonstrated by his inability to show concrete plans for the future, in itself. Perhaps, on a
statistical or theoretical level, those most likely to commit future acts
of violence are those with the least direction and structure in their
lives. But statistical and theoretical information is not evidence in any
individual case. If that type of information is to be considered, the
next step would be for the Board to impose a minimum income requirement in order for someone to be granted parole since, on average, those with less money commit more crimes.168 This trend is
dangerous and discriminatory.
One more suitability factor, battered woman syndrome,169 is potentially problematic. There is no evidence that the Board has ever
used a female inmate’s inability to show that she was suffering from
battered woman syndrome at the time of the offense as justification
for denying parole. In this way, the factor is less troublesome. That
being said, this factor does pose some concerns regarding disparate
treatment along gender lines. For example, Rosenkrantz, who killed
the man who outed him to his father, arguably had a claim similar to a
battered woman syndrome argument in that his murder may have
been the breaking point in a long history of abuse and fear of his
father.170 Yet, even if Rosenkrantz had been a woman, he still would
164. Id. at 575.
165. Id. at 584 (“The record establishes, moreover, that although petitioner has stated
that his conduct was ‘wrong,’ and feels some remorse for the crime, he has failed to gain
insight or understanding into either his violent conduct or his commission of the commitment offense.”).
166. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(8) (2008).
167. See, e.g., Willis v. Campbell, No. 2:06-cv-01829-AK, 2009 WL 50076, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2009); People v. Chastain, No. E032987, 2004 WL 542228, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
19, 2004).
168. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, Nov. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
dccc.pdf.
169. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(5) (2008).
170. See supra Part I.C.1. The facts of the case also suggest that Rosenkrantz’s father was
opposed to homosexuality, so much so that Rosenkrantz may have felt threatened and
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not have benefited from this factor because the abuse was not the
result of domestic violence.171 Therefore, this factor allows for the different treatment of inmates—both male and female—who have suffered abuse, based only on the happenstance of the source of the
abuse. To fix this unfairness, the factor should be revised, and the
Board should take into consideration any type of abuse that may have
spurred the inmate to commit violent acts.
The remaining five suitability factors pose insignificant concerns.
The age factor allows the Board to view advanced age as a characteristic of suitability.172 The other factors merely provide the converse to
an unsuitability factor: the lack of a juvenile record or criminal history;173 a history of “stable relationships with others;”174 positive institutional behavior;175 and whether the crime was “the result of
significant stress . . . especially if the stress [was] built over a long
period of time.”176 These five factors pose fewer risks, as the inability
for prisoners to demonstrate them will often mean that the Board can
provide evidence of the converse. Thus, they will rarely be used to
punish the inmate for his or her inability to demonstrate suitability.

IV.

Policy Concerns

A. California’s Overflowing Prisons
As of February 2009, California prisoners were reportedly operating at 188% of capacity.177 Another report estimated that, at the end
desperate. See In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 185 (Cal. 2002) (describing how Rosenkrantz’s father cried and “angrily questioned him” about Redman’s allegations that he was
gay); see also id. at 184 (“Petitioner testified that he knew at an early age that he was gay but
also knew that this circumstance was unacceptable to his family—particularly to his
father.”).
171. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2000(b)(7) (2008) (“Evidence of the effects of physical,
emotional, or mental abuse upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic
violence where it appears the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.” (emphasis added)).
172. See id. § 2402(d)(7).
173. Id. § 2402(d)(1), (d)(6).
174. Id. § 2402(d)(2).
175. Id. § 2402(d)(9).
176. Id. § 2402(d)(4). This is essentially the converse of the fifth sub-factor of the commitment offense, which reads: “[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in
relation to the offense.” Id. § 2402(c)(1)(E).
177. Matt Kelley, Will California Free 57,000 Prisoners?, CRIMINAL JUSTICE—CHANGE.ORG,
Feb. 12, 2009, http://criminaljustice.change.org/blog/view/will_california_free_57000_
prisoners.
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of 2007, they were operating at 170% capacity.178 These figures show
that the conditions of California’s prisons are dire. A number of solutions have been proposed, including a strict population cap or the
outsourcing of prisoners to correction facilities in other states.179
Some have even suggested simply releasing certain prisoners.180 This
crisis, therefore, provides an excellent reason to repair the broken parole system.
This is not to say that every parole-eligible inmate should be released. But perhaps this is the time to recognize that the “some evidence” standard is simply too weak to ensure the release of inmates
who do not pose an unreasonable threat to society. The standard
should be strengthened, and the regulations reworked, so as to ease
the strain on California’s prisons.
B. The Functional Purpose of Parole
Parole is a modern creation, intended to increase the humaneness of the penitentiary system by giving eligible inmates the “hope
and prospect of liberation from the prison walls under the restrictions
and conditions of a parole.”181 Therefore, the original purpose of parole was rehabilitation, rather than retribution.182 As explained by the
United States Supreme Court, “[i]ts purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are
able, without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an individual in prison.”183 This shows that the liberty interests of individual
inmates are not the only concerns—society has a monetary interest as
178. See California Prisons Rocked by Problems, USATODAY.COM, April 5, 2008, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-05-california-prisons_N.htm (“California’s 33
prisons have a capacity of roughly 100,000 inmates but hold about 170,000.”).
179. See id.
180. See id.; see also Kelley, supra note 177 (“After months of wrangling, a federal threejudge panel announced . . . that it intended to order California to significantly reduce its
prison population in order to ensure that the state is providing the services constitutionally
guaranteed to prisoners, like adequate health care. The state will appeal, of course, and
litigation will probably go on for years. But the writing is on the wall. . . . The state would
likely aim to reduce the population through early parole release and a reduction in the
number of parolees readmitted for violations.”).
181. Roberts v. Duffy, 140 P. 260, 262 (Cal. 1914).
182. For a discussion of this transition from rehabilitative to retributive goals, see
Daniel Weiss, Note, California’s Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1585–87 (2005). See also id. at 1599 (“The Board . . . should not be
allowed to consider retributive, backward-looking factors. The Board should be allowed to
consider only rehabilitative, forward-looking factors.”).
183. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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well. Additionally, society has an interest in the effective functioning
of our penological system. Since the system, as it currently exists, fails
to adequately determine an inmate’s suitability for parole, it is failing
society is that it is preventing the rehabilitation of prisoners capable of
reintegrating into society and wasting tax dollars in the process.184
The Court also noted that, “[r]ather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment
of convicted criminals.”185 In this sense, parole is no different from an
inmate’s transfer to another prison facility. Of course, parole involves
much greater concerns for both the liberty of the inmate and the
safety of the public. As a result, the parole process is met with greater
procedural safeguards. But this does not change its designation as a
rehabilitative form of state capture, rather than mere release.186

V.

Proposed Solutions

The complex and institutionalized nature of this problem requires a range of solutions. As addressed in Part III, one such solution
involves an overhaul of the regulatory scheme.187 Another solution involves improving conditions and services for prisoners; that is, actually
making prisons rehabilitative. But that solution deserves far more attention than can be given in this Comment. Instead, the primary solution
discussed here is the strengthening of the judicial standard of review.
This solution raises unique benefits and concerns. The judiciary is
more removed from political influence than the executive is, but it is
also, generally, lacking in the latter’s expertise. However, courts are
familiar with constitutional requirements and statutory interpretation
and are an appropriate venue in which to remedy the executive’s errors in parole determinations. To aid in this discussion, the following
sections briefly examine the parole schemes of other states.
A. States That Recognize a Liberty Interest in Parole
Every state allows at least some criminal offenders to be given the
possibility of parole, even if it is purely within the discretion of the
184. See supra Part I.A.
185. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477.
186. See id. The Court refers to parole as a “variation on imprisonment,” emphasizing
that the inmate is still deprived of liberty while on parole and is thus still, in many ways, a
prisoner of the state. Id.
187. Other commentators have recommended doing this. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note
182, at 1597–1600 (suggesting creative and sweeping changes to the entire system, including the regulations used by the Board).
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parole agency whether such release is ever granted.188 States diverge
on their views of parole as a right, as well as the level of scrutiny with
which courts should review agency denials of parole. Currently, there
are few states that recognize a parole-eligible inmate’s liberty interest
in actually being released. In addition to California, five states have
explicitly recognized the right: New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia.189 Three more have at least implicitly
recognized it: Alaska, Oregon, and Vermont.190 The remaining states,
and the District of Columbia, do not recognize a liberty interest in
parole.191 Even if no liberty interest exists, all states retain mechanisms of judicial review to remedy parole denials that are arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory.192 As explained by the Third Circuit,
“[e]ven if a state statute does not give rise to a liberty interest in parole release under Greenholtz [sic], once a state institutes a parole
system all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the
due process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons.”193
The significance of recognizing a liberty interest in parole is questionable if it only provides for the reversal of agency decisions that are
arbitrary or otherwise unconstitutional. In California, while the courts
claim to scrutinize decisions for some evidence of current dangerousness, the only reversals seem to arise out of parole denials that are so
inexplicable that they rise to the level of arbitrary or discriminatory
decisions.194 The same conclusions would be reached if California did
not recognize a liberty interest in parole.195 This demonstrates that
the “some evidence” standard provides no additional protections to
inmates. It is incompatible with the additional due process rights af188. See infra Table 1.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Bussiere v. Cunningham, 571 A.2d 908, 912–13 (N.H. 1990) (refusing to
find a liberty interest, but recognizing that inmates are protected from “arbitrary and capricious” denials of parole); Ellard v. State, 474 So.2d 743, 750 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (noting
that such agency decisions are reversed if found to be “illegal, capricious, or unsupported
by [legal] evidence”); U.S. ex rel. O’Connor v. MacDonald, 449 F. Supp. 291, 296 (E.D. Ill.
1978) (“Of course, the Board’s action is subject to judicial review in order to determine
whether it has followed the appropriate criteria, rational and consistent with the applicable
statutes, and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious nor based on impermissible
considerations.”).
193. Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980).
194. See generally Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 553 (Cal. 2008).
195. See Block, 631 F.2d at 236.
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forded California prisoners based on their recognized liberty interests
in parole. The standard allows the executive and the courts to circumvent the rights of parole-eligible prisoners under the guise of a constitutional procedure. In reality, though, both overlook the fact that
more process is due; both lack process that actually vindicates the
rights indisputably possessed by California prisoners.
B. States with “Heightened” Standards of Review and Suggestions
for California
Most states employ a level of judicial review that affords nearly
complete discretion to the parole agency.196 Like California, some employ the “some evidence” or “modicum of evidence” standards.197
However, two states—Alaska and New Jersey—employ unique standards and may provide guidance for California.
1. Alaska’s “Reasonable Basis” Standard
In Alaska, discretionary actions of the parole board, including decisions to grant or deny parole, are “reviewed under the ‘reasonable
basis’ standard,” to insure that they “are supported by evidence in the
record as a whole and there is no abuse of discretion.”198 In practice,
this standard functions similarly to California’s in that it mandates approval of the Board’s actions as long as they are supported by “reasons,” i.e., some evidence. On the other hand, the semantics of the
Alaska test suggests that it could be transformed into a workable
standard.
California could build on the reasonableness concept, and employ a reasonable person standard. The judicial standard would then
appear as follows: would a reasonable parole board conclude that the
inmate poses a current danger to society? This would be a minor increase in the standard, but it would contain one critical change; courts
would be permitted to evaluate the decision of the Board, and not simply defer to it upon a showing of any evidence.
There are, of course, problems with this test. For one, it would
essentially alter the evidentiary standard of review from abuse of dis196. See, e.g., White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 713 N.E.2d 327, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[T]he Parole Board has almost absolute discretion in carrying out its duties and . . . it is
not subject to the supervision or control of the Courts.” (citing Murphy v. Ind. Parole Bd.,
397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979))).
197. See, e.g., Bussiere, 571 A.2d at 912; Hamel v. Johnson, 25 P.3d 314, 318 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001).
198. Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085, 1090–91 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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cretion to de novo. Courts would have to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness, or correctness, of the Board’s decision.
Second, it could lead to a flood of litigation, as every eligible inmate
who is denied parole would rush to appeal, figuring that a clever and
creative argument could win over a lenient court.
These problems are not insubstantial, and they may indeed be
fatal. However, one cannot help but consider the lesser of two evils in
this context. California has two options: (1) employ this standard and
run into some serious, yet not necessarily insurmountable, administrative problems; or (2) continue the status quo and perpetuate the violation of the due process rights of prisoners.
2. New Jersey’s “Substantial Evidence” Standard
In New Jersey, courts review the parole board’s decision for
“whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action.”199 Specifically, courts review whether there is “sufficient credible evidence” that supports the
conclusion that the inmate “will commit crimes if released.”200 This
standard provides a middle ground between the highly deferential
“some evidence” standard and the much less discretionary “reasonable person” standard. It would allow the Board to enjoy wide discretion in how it investigates and evaluates inmates. At the same time, it
would prevent the troubling practice of denying parole if any piece of
negative history—no matter how far removed or how seemingly insignificant—is presented and successfully argued to be probative of current dangerousness.201
3. Proposal for a “Weighing” Test
Another solution may be to employ a weighing test whereby the
Board would determine the presence of suitability and unsuitability
factors and weigh them against each other. Courts could then employ
an abuse of discretion standard that would test the reasonableness of
the Board’s determination in light of the statutory and constitutional
rights at stake. This would be the least radical change, because as it
would leave great discretion in the hands of the Board. The primary
change would be that a finding of any potential for dangerousness
would not automatically prevent courts from overturning the Board’s
denial of parole. Instead, the Board would be required to engage in
199. Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 711 A.2d 260, 262 (N.J. 1998).
200. Id. at 270.
201. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 555 (Cal. 2008).
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the same type of weighing analysis employed by many states in the
determination of whether to sentence a defendant to death.202 The
decisionmakers must take all factors into account, fairly judge the
weight and importance of each, and determine the individual’s fate
based on which way the scales tip. This test would more accurately
reflect the level of complexity inherent in the decision of whether
someone poses a threat to society.

Conclusion
California’s parole system is suffering from systemic failure. The
executive employs vague, overbroad, and inappropriate standards.
The standard employed by courts for reviewing these decisions is essentially meaningless. Furthermore, politics and prejudice pervade
the entire process. Prisoners have been granted a constitutional right
to parole; a parole-eligible inmate enjoys a presumption of release unless the Board meets its burden of demonstrating that the prisoner
poses a current threat to society. Yet, the Board, the governor, and the
courts have lost sight of this. Until a change is made, prisoners will
continue to suffer depravations of their due process rights. While fundamental change is needed, an immediate remedy is well within
reach. The courts should imply a less deferential standard of review to
ensure that prisoners maintain their statutory and constitutional
rights.

Table 1
State

Parole Statute

Liberty Interest

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 15-22-26 (2009).

NO. Ellard v. State, 474 So. 2d 743, 754
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984).

Alaska

ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.010
(2009).

IMPLIED. See Smith v. Dept. of Corr., 872
P.2d 1218, 1222 (Alaska 1994) (“The State
takes no issue with Bynum’s contention
that he has a protected liberty interest in
conditions of parole and we accept this
implied concession.”).

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31412 (2009).

NO. Foggy v. Eyman, 516 P.2d 321, 323
(Ariz. 1973).

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-701
(2008).

NO. Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199, 201
(8th Cir. 1990).

California

CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a)
(West 2008).

YES. In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 207
(Cal. 2002).

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 172-201 (LexisNexis 2009).

NO. Silva v. People, 407 P.2d 38, 39 (Colo.
1965).

202. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2009).
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Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a
(2009).

NO. Baker v. Comm’r of Corr., 914 A.2d
1034, 1046 (Conn. 2007).

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4347 (2008).

NO. Eskridge v. Casson, 471 F. Supp. 98,
101 (D. Del. 1979).

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE § 24-404 (2009).

NO. Bogan v. Bd. of Parole, 749 A.2d 127,
129 (D.C. 2000).

Florida

FLA. STAT. § 947.18 (2009).

NO. Kirsch v. Greadington, 425 So. 2d 153,
155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-42
(2008).

NO. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1499
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT. § 353-62
(2008).

NO. Turner v. Paroling Auth., 1 P.3d 768,
775 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000).

Idaho

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-223
(2008).

NO. Hays v. State, 975 P.2d 1181, 1186
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999).

Illinois

730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-5
(2009).

NO. Blythe v. Lane, 551 N.E.2d 680, 685
(Ill. Ct. App. 1990).

Indiana

IND. CODE. § 11-13-3-2
(2009).

NO. Holland v. Rizzo, 872 N.E.2d 659, 663
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Iowa

IOWA CODE § 906.3 (2009).

NO. Lyon v. State, 404 N.W.2d 580, 583
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987).

Kansas

KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3717 (West 2008).

NO. Gilmore v. Parole Bd. 756 P.2d 410,
415 (Kan. 1988).

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 439.340 (West 2009).

NO. Belcher v. Parole Bd., 917 S.W.2d 584,
587 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:574.4 (2009).

NO. Sinclair v. Kennedy, 701 So. 2d 457,
462 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34A, § 5211 (2008).

NO. Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809, 815
(Me. 1967).

Maryland

MD. CODE. ANN., CORR.
SERVS. § 4-305 (West 2009).

NO. Lomax v. Warden, Corr. Training Ctr.,
707 A.2d 395, 402 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1998).

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 27, § 5
(2009).

NO. Quegan v. Parole Bd., 673 N.E.2d 42,
44 (Mass. 1996).

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233
(2009).

NO. Lee v. Withrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d 789,
792 (E.D. Mich. 1999).

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. § 609.12 (2009).

NO. State v. Morse, 398 N.W.2d 673, 679
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (limited to prisoners
serving mandatory sentences with no
“target release date”).

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3
(2009).

NO. Hopson v. Parole Bd., 976 So. 2d 973,
975 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT. § 217.690
(2009).

NO. Gale v. Moore, 587 F. Supp. 1491,
1493 (W.D. Mo. 1984).

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23201 (2008).

NO. Worden v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole,
962 P.2d 1157, 1165–66 (Mont. 1998).

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 831,111 (LexisNexis 2009).

NO. Moore v. Bd. of Parole, 679 N.W.2d
427, 438–39 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).

Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.1099
(2009).

NO. Austin v. Armstrong, 473 F. Supp.
1114, 1117 (D. Nev. 1979).
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New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651A:6 (2009).

NO. Bussiere v. Cunningham, 571 A.2d
908, 912 (N.H. 1990).

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.53
(West 2009).

YES. Thompson v. Parole Bd., 509 A.2d
241, 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. § 31-21-10
(2009).

NO. Owens v. Swope, 287 P.2d 605, 612
(N.M. 1955).

New York

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c
(McKinney 2009).

NO. Williams v. Bd. of Parole, 633 N.Y.S.2d
182, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).

North
Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-1371
(2008).

YES. Harwood v. Johnson, 388 S.E.2d 439,
444 (N.C. 1990).

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-59-07
(2007).

NO. Patten v. North Dakota Parole Bd.,
783 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1986).

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 2967.03 (West 2009).

NO. State ex rel. Hattie v. Goldhardt, 630
N.E.2d 696, 698 (Ohio 1994).

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 332.7
(2009).

NO. Shabazz v. Keating, 977 P.2d 1089,
1093 (Okla. 1999).

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. § 144.050
(2008).

IMPLIED. See Davis v. Bd. of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision, 114 P.3d 1138,
1140 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (assuming,
without deciding, that the liberty interest
exists). But see OR. REV. STAT. § 144.050
(2008) (using permissive language).

Pennsylvania

61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 331.22
(2009).

NO. Weaver v. Bd. of Prob. and Parole,
688 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-14.1
(2008).

YES. Bishop v. State, 667 A.2d 275, 276
(R.I. 1995).

South
Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-645
(2008).

NO. Sullivan v. Dept. of Corrections, 586
S.E.2d 124, 127 (S.C. 2003).

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15-8
(2008).

NO. Bergee v. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles,
608 N.W.2d 636, 640–41 (S.D. 2000).

Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28117 (LexisNexis 2009).

NO. Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Texas

TEX. GOV’T CODE. ANN.
§ 508.147 (Vernon 2009).

YES. See Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553,
559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Under
certain circumstances, and absent certain
findings by the Parole Board, the language
of the Texas statute requires release. It
therefore creates a legitimate, although
limited, expectation of release.”).

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-5
(LexisNexis 2008).

NO. Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1016
(10th Cir. 1994).

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 502a
(2009).

IMPLIED. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28
§ 502a(b) (2009) (using mandatory
language to describe right to parole); see
also Bock v. Gold, 959 A.2d 990, 991 (Vt.
2008) (referencing, with approval, the
lower court’s implication of the liberty
interest).

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-154.1
(LexisNexis 2009).

NO. Robinson v. Fahey, 366 F. Supp. 2d
368, 371 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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Washington

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.017
(2009).

NO. In re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320, 328–29
(Wash. 2006).

West Virginia

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-13
(West 2009).

YES. Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183, 191
(W. Va. 1980).

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2008).

NO. State ex rel. Britt v. Gamble, 653
N.W.2d 143, 148 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-402
(2008).

NO. Seavolt v. Escamilla, 17 F. App’x. 806,
807 (10th Cir. 2001).
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